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The Court of Justice of the European Union clarifies 






On 18 December 2014, in International Stem Cell Corporation v. Comptroller General of Patents, 
Designs and Trade Marks (C-364/13), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered 
an important decision regarding the scope of the exclusion from patentability on morality-related 
grounds under Article 6(2) of the Directive 98/44/EC (“Directive 98/44/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological 
inventions”; hereinafter the “Biotech Directive”). 
 
The Court made first an important distinction between embryonic stem cell technologies based on 
fertilised human ovum and those based on unfertilised human ovum stimulated by parthenogenesis. 
The CJEU held, in particular, that a human ovum: (i) who is unfertilized and (ii) whose division and 
further development has been stimulated by parthenogenesis, is not a human embryo under Article 
6(2)(c) of the Biotech Directive, if it in itself has not the inherent capacity of developing into a 
human being, this matter to be ascertained by the national court in the light of current scientific 
knowledge. It follows that stem cells obtained from such human ova cannot be considered 
unpatentable. 
 
II. Legal context and background 
 
The Biotech Directive affirms the patentability of inventions related to life forms, subject to some 
important exceptions. Indeed, the need to reconcile the objective of promoting research and 
investment with the protection of the right to life and the fundamental principles of ethics has led 
the EU legislator to exclude from patentability certain categories of biotech inventions, whose 
exploitation would be contrary to ordre pubic and accepted principles of morality. That is why 
Article 6(2) has been inserted into the Biotech Directive: this provision contains a non-exhaustive 
list of biotech inventions that cannot be considered patentable on morality-related grounds, 
including uses of human embryos for commercial or industrial purposes (see Article 6(2)(c) of the 
Biotech Directive). 
  
The need to strike a balance between different (and often conflicting) needs and interests is clearly 
reflected in several recitals of the Biotech Directive: 
  Recital 1: “biotechnology and genetic engineering are playing an increasingly important 
role in a broad range of industries and the protection of biotechnological inventions will 
certainly be of fundamental importance for the Community’s industrial development”; 
  Recital 2: “in particular in the field of genetic engineering, research and development 
require a considerable amount of high-risk investment and therefore only adequate legal 
protection can make them profitable”; 
  Recital 16: “patent law must be applied so as to respect the fundamental principles 
safeguarding the dignity and integrity of the person; whereas it is important to assert the 
principle that the human body, at any stage in its formation or development, including germ 
cells, and the simple discovery of one of its elements or one of its products, including the 
sequence or partial sequence of a human gene, cannot be patented;  
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 Recital 37: “the principle whereby inventions must be excluded from patentability where 
their commercial exploitation offends against ordre public or morality must also be stressed 
in this Directive”. 
 
In Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace (C-34/10, decision of 18 October 2011), the CJEU had already 
given an interpretation of human embryo under Article 6(2)(c) of the Biotech Directive – and had 
considered unpatentable stem cells obtained by destroying human embryos. The Court held, in 
particular, that EU law excludes “any possibility of patentability where respect for human dignity 
could thereby be affected”, hence the term «“human embryo” [...] must be understood in a wide 
sense» (par. n. 34); then «any human ovum must, as soon as fertilised, be regarded as a ‘human 
embryo’ within the meaning and for the purposes of the application of Article 6(2)(c) of the 
Directive, since that fertilisation is such as to commence the process of development of a human 
being» (par. n. 35); this concept also includes “a non-fertilised human ovum into which the cell 
nucleus from a mature human cell has been transplanted and a non-fertilised human ovum whose 
division and further development have been stimulated by parthenogenesis” (par. n. 36). 
 
Three years later in International Stem Cell Corporation the CJEU has had the chance to shed light 
on an issue left unclarified by Brüstle. The case started when the US biotech company, International 
Stem Cell Corporation, filed two applications for UK patents with the British Intellectual Property 
Office (IPO). The applications related to the use of oocytes activated by parthenogenesis and human 
stem cell lines. Following the CJEU’s findings in Brüstle (see, eg, paragraph 36), the IPO held that 
these inventions were not patentable because “capable of commencing the process of development 
of a human being just as an embryo created by fertilisation of an ovum can do so”: their economic 
exploitation would therefore constitute an unpatentable economic use of human embryos under 
Article 6(2)(c) of the Biotech Directive. The refusal to grant a patent was challenged by the 
applicant before the High Court of England and Wales, which then referred the case to the CJEU 
basically asking whether the ruling in Brüstle applies in relation to parthenogenetically-activated 
unfertilised human ova “which in contrast to fertilised ova  [...] are incapable of developing into 
human beings”. 
 
III. The decision 
 
Preliminarily, the CJEU noted that the definition of “human embryo” is an autonomous concept of 
EU law. Should it not be the case, as the Court also noted in Brüstle, the functioning of the 
European common market would be jeopardised: indeed, in the presence of different legislative 
definitions of “human embryo” among Member States, enterprises, researchers and scientists would 
be tempted to file their patent applications in the country that embraces the more restrictive 
definition of “human embryo” (paragraphs 25-28). 
 
Then the Court – and this is the main point of the ruling – clarified that in order to constitute a 
“human embryo” for the purposes of the Biotech Directive, the stimulated ovum must have the 
“inherent capacity to develop into a human being”. This is in contrast to its previous decision in 
Brüstle where the CJEU held that such an ovum would only constitute a ‘human embryo’ if it were 
“capable of [just] commencing the process of development of a human being” (emphasis added). 
After International Stem Cell Corporation, therefore, the mere fact that a parthenogenetically-
activated human ovum commences a process of development is not sufficient for it to be considered 
as a “human embryo”. 
 
The Court thus accepted the interpretation given by Advocate General Cruz Villalón, who had 
pointed out that the decisive criterion to determine what is and what is not “human embryo” within 
the meaning of the Biotech Directive is “the inherent capacity of developing into a human being, 
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i.e. whether it really constitutes the functional equivalent of a fertilised ovum” (see para. 73 of the 
Opinion and para. 28 of the decision, emphasis added); the Advocate General had added that «a 
parthenote does not, per se, have the required inherent capacity of developing into a human being 
and hence as such does not constitute a ‘human embryo’» (para. 74 of the opinion, emphasis 
added).  
 
It is national courts – the CJEU added - that have to determine whether a parthenote may or may not 
develop into a human being on the basis of the actual knowledge of medical science. Should the 
answer be negative, such parthenote cannot be considered unpatentable under Article 6(2)(c) of the 
Biotech Directive. 
 
The CJEU has been careful to label its decision as a clarification to its previous ruling in Brüstle. 
Obviously, the Court did not admit that in Brüstle it had committed a technical error or that it had 




This decision has already been welcomed by the European biotech and pharmaceutical industry as it 
will make easier for companies in this field to obtain patents for inventions from human embryonic 
stem cell research. To their eyes, the ruling will open the door for other patent applications using 
similar methods. Indeed, these industries strongly rely on patents to recoup the investments made to 
carry out research and development: in other words, without the possibility of relying on the 
monopolistic rents secured by patents, their business would be seriously jeopardised. 
 
It thus seems that the decision in International Stem Cell Corporation, narrowing the scope of the 
exclusion from patentability on morality-related grounds, has basically rebuild trust in an industry 
which had been hit hard by the ruling in Brüstle. Indeed, the finding in Brüstle that all stem cells 
that had been obtained by destroying human embryos should be considered unpatentable, regardless 
of whether there is a capability to develop into a human being, had been strongly criticised as it 
would be capable of triggering a brain drain of stem cells researchers and scientists towards more 
business-friendly countries such as US and Japan.  
 
The industry is thus convinced that the ruling in International Stem Cell Corporation will  provide 
more legal certainty and encourage investments in a field which is considered by many 
commentators and scientists as key for the development of new medical treatments and drugs. 
 
Yet, this decision might not turn out to be entirely beneficial to the industry. It could indeed be 
argued that, notwithstanding this ruling, EU Member States could still exclude parthenote-based 
inventions from patentability on morality-related grounds under the first paragraph of Article 6 of 
the Biotech Directive, according to which “[i]nventions shall be considered unpatentable where 
their commercial exploitation would be contrary to ordre public or morality”. This is a general 
clause “borrowed” from both the European Patent Convention (Article 53(a)) and the WTO 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Article 27, para. 2): it 
basically grants Member States wide discretion when it comes to excluding the patentability of 
subject matter on ethical grounds, as it has already been noted by the CJEU in  Brüstle (see para. 29 
of  the decision).  
 






City University London 
 
Angelo Maria Rovati 
Univesity of Pavia 
 
